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NOTES
ENFORCEMENT OF AN INVALID BY-LAW AS A CONTRACT
AMONG THE SHAREHOLDERS
This article will deal with the question of whether a by-law which has
been declared invalid as a by-law may nevertheless be sustained as a contract among the shareholders. The related question of what constitutes
sufficient cause to declare a by-law invalid is beyond the purview of this
article.
This subject was suggested by the recent Montana decision, Sensabaugh
v. Polson Plywood Company.1 In that case the shareholders unaminously
adopted a by-law which attempted to dispense with cumlative voting. In
the decision in which three justices concurred and two justices, writing
separate opinions, dissented in part and concurred in part, the court held
that the by-law in question was invalid as being contra to the constitutional
provision which, they determined, mandatorily required cumulative voting.
On the question of whether this by-law was enforceable as a contract,
the court held that the invalid by-law was not enforceable, even among
those shareholders assenting to it, as a contract. The majority opinion
1.

___.Mont.

342 P.2d 1064 (1959).
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made a distinction between shareholders' contracts made without the realm
of corporate structure and those carried on or attempted within the
corporate structure. The court stated that the shareholders could -have
entered into a contract among themselves to eliminate cumulative voting,
but by their attempt to put this contract into the form of a by-law, the
majority attempted to bind all stockholders, including those not represented
at the meeting when the by-law was approved. The majority opinion, taking
the view that this -type of agreement was valid but that the mechanics were
in error, makes this an especially interesting case since the other two
justices not only took opposite views from the majority but also from each
other. Justice Angstman agreed that the shareholders could make a valid
contract whereby they surrendered the right to cumulative voting but
disagreed with the majority in their holding that such an agreement could
not be expressed in the form of a by-law to which the shareholder assented.
He stated, "I know of no rule of law which prescribes any particular form
that such a contract must take." Justice Bottomly stated, as did the
majority, that the Montana Constitution prohibited the by-law in question,
and stated further, "It is my opinion that any contract between stock-holders
for the election of directors or trustees of such a corporation 'other than
prescribed by the Constitution is void and courts have no more power or
authority than has an individual or a combination of stockholders to
ignore, set aside or disrupt this established public policy of -the state."
Thus Justice Bottomly was of the opinion that the shareholders agreement,
being contra to the constitutional provision, was invalid per se, and
could not be sustained as a contract among the shareholders regardless of
the form they choose for expressing their agreement.
Justice Bottomly's opinion has the support of a group of cases which
seem to state that where the by-law is invalid because it is unconstitutional
or contrary to public policy, the by-law may not be enforced as a contract
among the shareholders, even as against a shareholder assenting to it.2
The New York Court of Appeals would apparently approve of Justice
Bottomly's reasoning.In the Benintendi case the New York Court,
holding that an agreement expressed in the form of invalid by-laws was
unenforceable because it was in contravention of state policy, stated that:
Those who own all the stock of a corporation may, so long
as they conduct the corporate affairs in accordance with the
statutory rules, deal as they will with the corporation's property
(always assuming nothing is done prejudicial to creditors' rights).
They may, individually, bind themselves in advance to vote in a
certain way or for certain persons. But this State has decreed
that every stock corporation chartered by it must have a representative government, with voting conducted conformably to the
statutes, and the power of decision lodged in certain fractions,
always more than half, of the stock. That whole concept is destroyed when the stockholders, by agreement, by-law, or certificate
of incorporation provision, as to unanimous action, give the
minority interest an absolute, permanent, all-inclusive power of
2.
3.

See collection of cases 159 A.L.R. 296.
Beneintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d, 159 A.L.R. 280 (1945).
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veto. We do not hold that an arrangement would necessarily be
invalid, which, for particular
decisions, would require unanimous
4
consent of all stockholders.
Thus the court supports the view that a by-law which contravenes public
policy will not be enforced as a contract. The dissenting opinion in -the
Benintendi case (a four to three decision) denied that there was any public
policy involved. The dissenters felt that the stockholders' agreement
which had been expressed as a by-law could be specifically enforced through
the injunctive process of an equity court by forbidding a breach of the
agreement.5 The dissenting opinion stated, "To implement their agreement
they chose a method forbidden by statute. The agreement, however was
valid without the method chosen." Even though the dissenters wanted the
agreement upheld, they conceded that, "Despite power of 100% of the
stockholders, they may not write into a certificate of incorporation nor
adopt in by-laws provisions contrary to applicable statutes. Since corporations are creatures of statute, their charters and by-laws must conform to
the will of the creating power."
The basis for the court's distinction in the Sensabaugh case, between
shareholders' contracts made without the realm of the corporate structure
and those carried on or attempted within the corporate structure, is
apparently derived from the Buck case, a recent Nebraska decision.0
Although the Nebraska case did not involve an invalid by-law, the facts
were very similar to those in the Montana case in that there was a constitutional provision requiring cumulative voting. The shareholders
entered into a separate agreement which the defendant contended was in
violation of the constitution. The court, in enforcing the agreement, after
referring to the constitutional provision requiring cumulative voting and
reciting the provision that such directors or managers shall not be elected
in any other manner, said:
The latter prohibition, as we view it, operates to prevent a corporation by its articles of incorporation, by-laws, or any act of its
directors or stockholders from depriving a stockholder of the
right to vote his stock in the manner specified in the Constitution
and statute. But such provision does not purport to limit the right
of the stockholder to contract with reference to his stock. It grants
him a right or privilege which he may or may not exercise as he
sees fit, but it is one of the corporation of any agency cannot
deprive -him. Neither the constitutional provision nor statute
purports to limit the right of the stockholder to contract with
other stockholders with respect to such a right.7
This reasoning is further supported by a Missouri case which states,
"A construction has nowhere been given ...
within our knowledge or
research, so as to constitute it a prohibition or restriction on the right of
4.
5.
6.

Id. 159 A.L.R. at 283.
Id. 159 A.L.R. at 289.
E. K, Buck Retail Stores v. Harkert, 157 Neb. 867, 62 N.W.2d 288, 45 A.L.R.2d 774

7.

Id. 62 N.W.2d at 294.

(1954).
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stockholders to make their contracts which violate no rule of the common
law, and which affect no rights, except their own."
It has been suggested that the court in the Buck case was influenced by
the fact that the corporation involved was a closely-held corporation and
that in that type of case there is greater merit in decreeing enforcement of
the stockholders' agreement than in the case of a corporation with many
shareholders." This thought cannot, of course, be overlooked since in the
closely-held corporation the shareholders' transactions are usually culminated as a result of face-to-face negotiations. But it is submitted that
in a corporation with numerous widely scattered shareholders, the placing
of a shareholders' agreement in the by-laws is the most practical method
to carry out the shareholders' wishes. Even though practical, there is a
problem presented when all the shareholders will not assent to the by-law.
Under the general rule of contract law, the contract binds only those
assenting to the contract, while the general rule of corporation law states
that a valid by-law is binding on all shareholders including those who
resisted its adoption. Thus the problem becomes significant when a court
holds the by-law invalid-will the court hold those not assenting to the bylaw as bound by the agreement? As indicated in the Sensabaugh and
Buck cases, the agreement will only be sustained as to those assenting to it.
Although the cases in which the question of enforcing an invalid
by-law as a contract have been relatively limited, it is a reasonably safe
statement that when a by-law, although held to be invalid, is not opposed
to public policy, it will be held to be a contract among those assenting
to it. This type of question will still be presented to the courts in the
future for a determination of the public policy question.
These cases generally arise with the plaintiff attempting to have the
court enjoin the breach of the agreement and the defendant claiming that
"public policy" would be defeated by the enforcement of the agreement.
The dissenting opinion in the Benintendi case in partially answering such
a contention by the defendant stated:
The State does not need the assistance or leadership of
Dondero in vindicating its public policy. That statement is but
although in a
a paraphrase of the words of Gummere, Ch. J ...
different situation as follows: "So far as the vindication of our
laws and policies is concerned, it is enough to say that the state
does not need his aid for any such purpose, and that his assumed
status as a representative of the state cannot be recognized. If we
consider him as a mere individual, seeking ta repudiate for his own
personal advantage a fraud upon the state in which he was so long
a participant, it is entirely settled that the court of Chancery is
not open to him for any such purpose .... ,10
8.

State ex rel. Frank v. Swanger, 190 Mo. 561, 89 S.W. 872, 876, 2 L.R.A., N.S. 121

9.
10.

Recent cases, 108 Pa. L. Rev. 754 (1960).
Benintendi v. Kenton Hotel, 294 N.Y. 112, 60 N.E.2d, 159 A.L.R. 280, 290 (1945).

(1905).
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CONCLUSIONS

The practical question presented by these cases is that to prevent
unnecessary litigation the thoughtful attorney must concern himself with
the appropriate method for expression of the shareholders' agreement which
he is drafting. If a court followed the line of reasoning as in the Montana
decision, then an agreement "without the realm of corporate structure"
would seem to be called for, but when the contract is not one which is
likely to be held as opposed to "public policy," then a by-law provision
might be appropriate to bind the greatest amount of shareholders. In any
event, it is a question which must be given due consideration before the
agreement is submitted to the shareholders.
The proposed Wyoming Business Corporation Act eliminates this
problem when the agreement concerns the transferability and sale of
shares. Section 32 reads as follows:
The articles of incorporation or the by-laws of a corporation,
or an agreement among all the shareholders of a corporation may
impose restrictions on the sale or other disposition of its shares,
and on the transfer thereof, which do not unreasonably restrain
or prohibit transferability if each such restriction is copied at
length or in summary form on the face, or so copied on the back
and referred to on the face, of each certificate representing shares
to the transfer of which restriction applies.
The importance of this provision is readily appreciated by making a brief
survey of the cases involving the enforceability of an invalid by-law as a
contract. Most of the cases cited involving this proposition involve by-laws
restricting or regulating the right of shareholders to sell or transfer
their stock. 1
FLOYD R.

KING

THE END OF THE TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY AS THE IDEAL
GENERAL CREDITOR: LEWIS v. MANUFACTURERS
NATIONAL BANK OF DETROIT
The second sentence of Section 70, sub. c of the Bankruptcy Act,
popularly called the "strong-arm clause," reads as follows:
The trustee, as to all property, whether or not coming into
ossession or control of the court, upon which a creditor of the
ankrupt could have obtained a lien by legal or equitable proceedings at the (late of bankruptcy, shall be deemed vested as of
such date with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor
then holding a lien thereon by such proceedings, whether or not
such a creditor actually exists.'
The rights therein conferred upon the trustee are not derivative from
the rights of actual creditors; these rights are hypothetical.'-' The trustee's
11.
1.
2.

Annot ...... Invalid Bylaw as Contract, 159 A.L.R. 291.
11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1952 ed.)
Ibid. ". . . whether or not such a creditor actually exists."

